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Abstract: 
 
Science has changed many of our dearly held and commonsensical (but 
incorrect) beliefs.   For example, few still believe the world is flat, and few still 
believe the sun orbits the earth.  Few still believe humans are unrelated to the rest 
of the animal kingdom, and soon few will believe human thinking is computer-like.     
Instead, as with all animals, our thoughts are based on bodily experiences, and our 
thoughts and behaviors are controlled by bodily and neural systems of perception, 
action, and emotion interacting with the physical and social environments.   We are 
embodied; nothing more.   Embodied cognition is about cognition formatted in 
sensorimotor experience, and sensorimotor systems make those thoughts dynamic.   
Even processes that seem abstract, such as language comprehension and goal 
understanding are embodied.    Thus, embodied cognition is not limited to one type 
of thought or another: It is cognition. 
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Throughout history, careful observation and thinking—science—has 
changed long-held, cherished, and seemingly obvious beliefs.   For example, because 
of science, few still believe the world is flat, although it looks that way to casual 
observation.   Similarly, notions of human exceptionalism have a continuing history 
of being overthrown by science.    In the sixteenth century, the idea that the 
heavenly bodies revolved around us on earth was challenged by Copernicus; in the 
seventeenth century Galileo was punished for supporting the idea, but eventually 
science prevailed over church dogma.   In the nineteenth century, Darwin challenged 
the notion that humans were unrelated to other species.  Science continues to 
support notions of evolution and the descent of humans, but even in the twenty-first 
century, many (including a startling large number of elected officials in the US) 
refuse to acknowledge evolution.    
Another cherished aspect of human exceptionalism is that our thinking is 
special.   As Mahon (2014) has put it, “it is the independence of thought from 
perception and action that makes human cognition special…” One goal of the 
embodied approach to cognition is to show that this idea, although cherished and 
seemingly obvious, is also wrong. 
Introduction to Embodied Cognition 
Where did the idea that human thought is independent from perception and 
action come from?   As Barsalou (1999) discusses, great thinkers such as Aristotle, 
Epicurus, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Russell thought otherwise.    However, 
developments in the mid-twentieth century set the stage for a reversal in thought.   
First, there were the accomplishments of computer science demonstrating that, at 
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least in a computer, an aspect of thinking, namely computation, can be divorced 
from perception and action.  Second, linguistic analyses purported to show that 
aspects of language (the supposed “competence” of perfect grammar) could not 
arise from perception of linguistic input.   And finally, there was the backlash against 
behaviorism and its focus on overt behavior.   These intellectual trends culminated 
in the information processing (or cognitive) approach as exemplified by Newell and 
Simon’s (1972) Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH).   This hypothesis 
brilliantly solved an apparent conundrum:  How could human thought and a 
computer’s computations be the same sort of thing?   The answer was to propose 
that thinking of both kinds is the manipulation of abstract symbols, that is, symbols 
divorced from any perception and action.  
Research within the framework provided by the PSSH and related theories 
(e.g.,  Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1967; Kintsch, 1988; Landuaer & Dumais, 1997) appeared 
to make rapid progress.  What could be wrong?   One of the first cracks in the 
foundation came from Searle’s (1980) and Harnad’s (1990) discussions of the 
symbol grounding problem:  Closed systems of abstract symbols divorced from 
perception and action cannot provide an account of meaning.   Consider Harnad’s 
“symbol merry-go-round” argument.  Imagine that you land at an airport, perhaps in 
China, where you don’t speak the local language.    You see what appears to be a sign 
consisting of logograms (or any other non-iconic marks).   Although you don’t speak 
the language, you do have a dictionary written in that language.   You look up the 
first logogram and find its definition, but of course the definition consists of more 
logograms whose meanings are obscure to you.   Undaunted, you look up the 
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definition of the first logogram in the definition, and you find that its definition 
consists of even more uninterpretable logograms.   The point is that no matter how 
many of the logograms you look up, this closed system of abstract symbols will 
never produce any meaning for you.    But in fact, a process of this sort is exactly the 
process of meaning-generation proposed by standard cognitive models such as 
Collins and Quillian (1969),  Kintsch (1988), and Landauer and Dumais (1997).   For 
example, Landuaer and Dumais wrote, “Given the strong inductive possibilities 
inherent in the system of words [logograms if you are in China] itself…the vast 
majority of referential meaning may well be inferred from experience with words 
alone” (page 227). 1   Contrary to Landuaer and Dumais (see Glenberg & Robertson, 
2000, and   Glenberg & Mehta, 2009, for data), we must escape from the symbol 
merry-go-round by grounding, or associating, those symbols in perception, action, 
and emotion, and thereby endowing them with meaning. 
A second crack in the foundation comes from standing back and considering 
that humans are animals and a product of evolution. Our morphology, physiology, 
                                                        
1 Landuaer and Dumais do acknowledge the symbol grounding problem.  “But still, 
to be more than an abstract system like mathematics words must touch reality at 
least occasionally” (p. 227). Their proposed solution is to encode, along with the 
word stream, the streams from other sensory modalities. “Because, purely at the 
word–word level, rabbit has been indirectly pre-established to be something like 
dog, animal, object, furry, cute, fast, ears, etc., it is much less mysterious that a few 
contiguous pairings of the word with scenes including the thing itself can teach the 
proper correspondences.” (p. 227).    
 
This proposed solution to the symbol grounding problem will not work, however, 
because it presupposes that the symbol grounding problem has been solved.  That 
is, the program in which the Landuaer and Dumain theory is instantiated, LSA, 
would need to know which pictures contained rabbits and which did not.   Similarly, 
it would need to know which words needed to be associated with which pictures.  
See Glenberg and Robertson (2000) for further discussion and empirical evidence. 
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and behavior evolved by selection for survival, that is, they are in the service of 
action that enhances survival and reproduction.2    To the extent that cognition 
evolved, it too must serve effective action, and take into account the body.   In 
escaping a predator, it would do a mole no good to ignore its body and try to fly.   
Similarly, if humans are to survive they cannot ignore their embodiment.   Thus, the 
embodied approach to cognition asserts that all cognitive processes are based 
on sensory, motor, and emotional processes, which are themselves grounded 
in body morphology and physiology.  Within this framework, the goal of 
cognition is effective action in the service of survival and reproduction.  
Much of the remainder of this essay will demonstrate how these claims about 
human thought can be aligned with the cherished and seemingly obvious beliefs that 
thought is abstract and independent of perception and action.    To do that, I will 
briefly discuss the embodiment of perception, object representation, language, and 
goals.  The curious reader can also read about attempts to use embodiment to 
explain aspects of culture (Soliman, Gibson, & Glenberg, 2013).   This review is 
followed by a sketch for how cognition can be unified by a focus on prediction. 
Embodiment in Perception and Action 
In 1979, Gibson introduced that term “affordance” to capture the relations 
between the body, objects, action, and perception.   As an example, chairs afford 
                                                        
2 How then, can we explain behaviors like over-eating and taking drugs that 
decrease survival? Two of the many arguments are:  1) Behaviors like over-eating 
do arise from an evolutionary imperative for high-calorie foods, but that imperative 
evolved in a different ecology, one in which high-calorie foods were rare.   2) 
Evolution need not hard-wire every behavior.  Instead, for humans, evolution 
resulted in a plastic brain that learns.  But given the probabilistic nature of stimuli 
and reinforcements, not all learned behavior will be beneficial in all environments.  
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sitting-on, but only for animals with certain types of bodies, namely human-like 
bodies.   Humans perceive that affordance, but an elephant, for example, would not.   
A child might perceive that a kitchen chair also affords hiding-under in a game of 
hide-and-seek, but an adult would not because the adult has the wrong type of body 
to squeeze under a chair.    Thus, the affordance hypothesis is that we perceive what 
is needed to guide action, and those perceptions are determined by our bodies, 
including morphology, physiology, and previously learned behaviors.    This is not to 
say that an adult (for example) cannot understand that a chair is hiding place for a 
child.   But this sort of understanding makes use of simulation (see the discussion of 
embodiment and language) which is itself embodied. 
Over the past few decades, researchers have convincingly demonstrated the 
role of affordances in perception.    For example, Proffitt (2006) reviews research 
showing how perception of slant of hills reflects physiological capabilities:  When 
tired, or when wearing a heavy backpack, a hill looks steeper.    When holding a tool 
that extends the reach, distances look shorter (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004).    
Tucker and Ellis (1998) demonstrated how looking at the picture of an object (e.g., a 
teacup with a handle) automatically primes the motor system, a phenomenon called 
motor resonance.  Bub and Masson (2012) write that “Motor resonance, far from 
being an epiphenomenon, is rooted in the conceptual organization of the lexicon,” 
and Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, and Thompson-Schill (2013) demonstrate how 
manual experience shapes object representations and motor resonance.  
There are striking reports of how changing the body changes perception.  For 
example, Arrighi, Cartocci, and Burr (2011) studied perception in paraplegics who 
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had lost the use of their legs in accidents.    Although the patients showed little 
disruption of visual acuity, their perception of point-light walkers was severely 
disrupted.   That is, because they could no longer use their motor systems for 
walking, those systems could not play their usual role in the perception of walking --
motor resonance was disrupted (see mirror neurons, Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Van der Hoort, Guterstam, and Ehrsson (2011) were 
able to demonstrate a related phenomenon.    A volunteer was equipped with a 
head-mounted display that projected either the legs of a giant or the legs of a doll 
where the volunteer’s own legs would be.    When the volunteer viewed the artificial 
legs being stroked, they felt their own legs being stroked, inducing an illusion of 
body size change.   Amazingly, this change in body size induced a change in 
perception:  With large bodies, distances seemed closer, and with small bodies 
distances seemed farther.   That is, we use our own bodies to perceive distances.   
These effects are consistent with Proffitt and Linkenauger’s (2013) claim that 
perception is scaled by aspects of the body. 
Embodiment in Language Comprehension 
Language comprehension is not the arrangement of abstract symbols (such 
as words or lemmas) into syntactic patterns.   Instead, comprehension is a 
simulation process.   That is, when understanding, we simulate the content of the 
language using bodily and neural systems of action, perception, and emotion.   
Sometimes this simulation is conscious, but often it is not and must be revealed 
using behavioral or imaging procedures. 
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Action.  Glenberg and Kaschak's (2002) action-sentence compatibility effect 
(ACE) was among the first behavioral demonstrations of the relation between action 
and language.   Participants read sentences describing transfer toward the reader 
(e.g., “Art gives you the pen”), away (e.g., “You give Art the pen”), or nonsense (e.g., 
“You give the pen Art”).  The task was to read the sentence and then to indicate if it 
was sensible by moving to and depressing a yes button or a no button.   For half the 
participants, the yes button required a movement away from the participant’s body, 
and for the other half, the yes button required a movement toward the body.   The 
ACE was the interaction between sentence direction and action direction:  When the 
two were congruent (e.g., both away), responding was faster than when the two 
were incongruent.   Apparently, participants were using the motor system to 
simulate the action of the sentence while understanding, and this simulation primed 
movement in the congruent direction.   
But does the ACE reflect comprehension or does it show interference in 
movement after the sentence is comprehended (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008)?    
Subsequent research has converged on the former.  For example, using transcranial 
magnetic stimulation, Glenberg et al. (2008) showed increased electrical activity in 
hand muscles while reading transfer sentences compared to control sentences.   
Glenberg, Sato, and Cattaneo (2008) further demonstrated that fatiguing (or 
adapting) the action system (e.g., by moving 600 beans individually from one 
container to another) slowed comprehension of sentences describing transfer in the 
same direction.   
 10 
One of the clearest demonstrations of the use of the motor system in 
language understanding is provided by Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004).    
Participants listened to action words such as “lick,” “pick,” and “kick” while their 
brains were being imaged using fMRI.   When listening to a verb describing mouth 
actions (e.g., “lick”), areas of motor cortex that control the mouth were particularly 
active; when listening to verbs describing hand actions, areas of motor cortex 
controlling the hand were active; and similar effects were found for verbs describing 
leg actions. 
Perception.   Zwaan and his colleagues have been resourceful in 
demonstrating perceptual effects during language comprehension.   In an early 
demonstration, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) had people determine if a picture was of 
an object named in a preceding sentence.    Consider sentences such as “The ranger 
saw the eagle in the sky” and “The ranger saw the eagle in the nest” followed by a 
picture of an eagle with outstretched or folded wings.  Although both pictures match 
the word (“eagle”) in both sentences, speed of responding was determined by 
whether the picture matched the simulation.   That is, a picture of an eagle with 
outstretched wings was responded to more quickly following the sentence 
describing an eagle in the sky compared to in the nest (and vice versa).     
Rueschemeyer, Glenberg, Kaschak, Mueller, & Friederici, (2010) helped to 
pin down the claim that perceptual systems are used in the simulation process.   
When reading sentences describing visual motion (e.g., “The car is coming toward 
you”), they found greater activity in area MT/V5 (associated with the processing of 
real visual motion) then when reading sentences describing a static visual scene.   
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Emotion.  Language is often used to convey events with emotional 
connotations.    For these sorts of sentences, simulation theory predicts that bodily 
and neural systems of emotion join with sensorimotor systems in producing the 
simulation.    Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, and Davidson (2010) were able 
to demonstrate this engagement using a type of natural (or unnatural, if you will) 
experiment.  The participants were women receiving cosmetic Botox treatments in 
the corrugator (frowning) muscle of the forehead.  The Botox paralyzes the muscle, 
which then reduces lines in the forehead, but it also makes it impossible for the 
muscle to be used in frowning.  That is, the muscle can no longer contribute to 
simulations of anger and sadness.  As predicted, injection of Botox in the corrugator 
muscles slowed comprehension of sentences describing angry and sad situations, 
but not happy situations. 
Abstract language.  Importantly, there have now been a number of 
demonstrations of embodied understanding of sentences describing abstract 
situations.    Among those are  Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) and Glenberg et al., 
(2008).  A particularly impressive set of findings was reported by Urrutia, Gennari, 
and de Vega (2012).   Participants read counterfactual sentences (e.g., “If Mary had 
cleaned the room, she would have moved the sofa”) that differed in the amount of 
effort required in the situation described (e.g., “moved the sofa/photograph”).  Thus 
the sentences described situations that had never occurred, and hence are abstract, 
and they differed in regard to implied forces, another abstract concept.   
Nonetheless, fMRI data indicated that participants used parts of the motor system to 
construct a simulation and that the simulation reflected the presumed effort. 
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Principles of embodied cognition have also been applied to the learning of 
abstract ideas in educational settings.   In brief, the embodied notion is that the 
abstract symbols of education—words, syntax, mathematical notation—must be 
grounded in the body for students to make sense of those symbols (Glenberg, 2008).   
A powerful demonstration of this principle is provided by Kontra, Lyons, Fischer, 
and Beilock (in press).   Their research examined processes of learning about the 
seemingly abstract concepts of torque and angular momentum.   Participants first 
read a description of angular momentum.   After an initial test, the participants 
either a) directly experienced torque and angular momentum by holding and 
manipulating spinning bicycle wheels or b) observed while their partner held and 
manipulated the wheels.   These experiences were followed by a posttest.    
Participants with direct experience improved from the initial test to the posttest, 
whereas the observers did not.   Furthermore, in one experiment, participants took 
the posttest while brain activity was monitored by fMRI.   There was a correlation of 
.58 between activity in motor regions of the brain and performance on the posttest.   
That is, understanding the “abstract” concept of angular momentum was facilitated 
by an embodied simulation using the motor system. 
The embodiment of goals and causation 
The notion of goals and intentions seem particularly abstract.   Nonetheless, 
it appears that we can often infer other people’s goals and intentions from just 
watching them act.   Do we use a set of abstract principles to make these inferences?  
In fact, the answer is simpler and more elegant:  We can often infer goals and 
intentions using a motor resonance process (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; 
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Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).  Visually perceiving an 
action activates neurons (mirror neurons) in our own motor system, which are also 
activated when we take that or a similar action.  This mirror neuron activation 
appears to encode the goal of the action that we have when performing the action in 
context.  Note that this resonance process requires that we have the motor 
competence to complete the action, thus developmental psychologists who study 
the acquisition of motor competence have been able to make impressive 
contributions to understanding of goals.  (See the following discussion of Osiurak 
and Badets (2014) for a sensorimotor account of goals in the absence of motor 
competence.) 
As an example, consider the “sticky mittens” procedure used by Sommerville, 
Woodward, and Needham (2005) to study goals in three-month old infants.  These 
infants do not usually have the motor competence to hold and manipulate objects.  
However if the infant wears mittens with a Velcro surface and swipes at an object 
with a complementary surface, then the object can be brought under control and 
examined by the infant.   In the experiments, half the children did exactly that and 
acted on a ball and a teddy bear.    The infants then repeatedly saw a mittened hand 
reach for one of the objects (e.g., the ball), until the infants habituated and stopped 
looking.   Next, the infant saw one of two events.   A new goal event showed the 
mittened hand make the same movement, but now the movement was toward a new 
goal (e.g., the teddy bear).    A new path event showed the mittened hand make a 
different movement, but end at the same goal (e.g., the ball, again).   The question is 
which of these new events will attract the infant’s attention, that is, which is treated 
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as different from the habituated event of watching the mittened hand reach for the 
ball?   Those infants without the sticky mitten experience paid equal (and modest) 
attention to the new goal and new path events.  For the infants given experience 
with the sticky mittens, however, their attention was strongly attracted by the new 
goal event.   That is, the infants who had developed some motor competence with 
the objects were able to discriminate between the goal of reaching for a ball and the 
goal of reaching for a teddy bear.   For these infants, goals reflected (and perhaps 
were constituted by) motor competence.    
Other sticky mitten research has demonstrated contributions of motor 
competence to cognitive skills long considered abstract.   For example, Rakison and 
Krogh (2010) demonstrated the role of motor competence in understanding causal 
situations.  Möhring and Frick (2013) demonstrated a contribution of motor 
competence to skill in mental rotation. 
Masson (2015) discusses data in Osiurak and Badets (2014) that seem to 
demonstrate that goals are abstract, rather than embodied.  In their experiment, 
participants were primed to open or close pliers, but the pliers could be normal 
(which close by closing the hand) or inverse (which close by opening the hand).   
The “opening” or “closing” prime was beneficial when it matched the goal (e.g., close 
the pliers) rather than the required hand action.   These data are consistent with the 
claim that not all goals are represented by movements.  But, do the data imply that 
goals are abstract, that is, non-embodied?  In fact, as discussed by Osiurak and 
Badets, these data are compatible with the embodied ideomotor principle, namely, 
that goals are encoded in terms of expected sensory effects.  In this case, the goal of 
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"opening" is represented as the visual sensory state corresponding to open pliers, 
regardless of the specific movements required to get the pliers open.   Osiurak and 
Badets go on to quote Mechsner, Kerzel, Knoblich, and Prinz (2001) “…voluntary 
movements are, in general, organized by way of a simple representation of the 
perceptual goals…” (p. 72).   Thus, not all goals are encoded as movements, but the 
data are consistent with the claim that goals are embodied, that is, sensori 
(perceptual)-motor.     
Is there a coherent account? 
Demonstrations of the importance of embodiment are becoming increasingly 
frequent.   At the same time, there has been a growing criticism that the 
demonstrations do not provide a unified account of cognition comparable to that 
provided by the PSSH.   But one such account, based on the notion of prediction, is 
taking shape. 
How is prediction embodied?   First, action control (and the motor system) is 
intimately concerned with prediction.   That is, every action is accompanied by 
predicted changes in our proprioception and perception of the world so that the 
system can determine if the action was successfully completed.   For example, in 
reaching for a glass of water, the system predicts how far the arm will have to reach, 
how wide the fingers need to open, and the feel of the cool, smooth glass.     
When predictions match the sensory consequences, those consequences are 
cancelled (or their importance reduced) to reduce information overload.    One 
demonstration of this cancelling is the inability to tickle oneself (Blakemore, 
Goodbody, & Wolpert, 1998).   Vision provides another demonstration.  Close one 
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eye and sweep the other back and forth across the visual field.  Although stimulation 
on the retina changes radically when the eye moves, the world appears stable.   That 
stability comes about because predictions based on the planned eye movements are 
used to cancel the sense of movement that would otherwise accompany changes in 
the visual field.   That is, the perceptual system correctly attributes the changes to 
self-movement rather than to movement of the world.   What happens when 
cancelling based on prediction fails?   To literally see the result, move your one open 
eye by nudging it with a finger.    Now the world seems to jump around with each 
nudge.   Because there is no eye movement signal from which predictions can be 
made, the changes on the retina (due to the nudge) cannot be cancelled, and hence 
the perceptual system attributes the changes to instability in the world. 
Note that predictions of this sort are usually not consciously experienced, 
probably take little effort, and are fast and automatic, at least in highly practiced 
domains of action such as grasping and eye movements.   Furthermore, prediction 
ties action to perception and vice versa.   As with the eye-movement example, the 
predictions are about how the world will look (after action).   Eder, Rothermund, De 
Houwer, and Hommel (in press) have proposed that a similar mechanism may fuse 
emotion into the action/perception representations, and  Wolpert, Doya, and 
Kawato (2003) describe how the prediction model can be applied to social 
interactions.    
The notion of prediction has been used to develop accounts of action control 
(Wolpert & Kawato, 1998), imagery (Grush, 2004), language perception and 
production (Pickering & Garrod, 2013), and language comprehension (Glenberg & 
 17 
Gallese, 2012).   Clark, (2013) proposes a unified account of prediction and suggests 
that “Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the 
functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of 
cortical processing to adaptive success.”  Thus, although the very notion of 
prediction seems non-embodied (unrelated to sensory, motor, and emotional 
systems), in fact prediction is at the core of those systems and ties them together to 
promote coherent perception and effective action. 
Do non-embodied systems play any role in cognition? 
This is still an open question.   Nonetheless, it is hard to see a role for non-
embodied systems.    By non-embodied, I mean systems (representations or 
processes) that are unrelated to perception, action, and emotion, for example the 
classic symbol systems envisioned by PHHS.    From the perspective of evolution, it 
is hard to see how those sorts of systems could arise.   They are even harder to 
understand from a functional perspective.   What role is there for a system that does 
not contribute to perception and action?   Furthermore, if one proposes that a non-
embodied system does contribute to perception and action, there is a difficult 
engineering problem:  how does the non-embodied system connect to the embodied 
system to control action? Descartes suggested communication through the pineal 
gland.    Modern-day Cartesians who propose abstract symbol systems haven’t 
offered a much better explanation.  This problem is made even more puzzling by the 
data reviewed above indicating that embodied systems do just fine accounting for 
perception, action, concrete cognition, and abstract cognition (see also Barsalou’s, 
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1999, arguments for the formal adequacy of perceptual symbol systems for abstract 
thought). 
Some domains of cognition do seem to be particularly abstract and, one 
might wonder if they are non-embodied.    With some thought, however, even these 
domains can aligned with embodiment.   For example, mathematics seems to be 
particularly abstract.   But, empirical work has now demonstrated how the body is 
involved in simple mathematics (Adriano, Diez, & Fernandez, 2014; Andres, Seron, & 
Olivier, 2007; Sato, Cattaneo, Rizzolatti, & Gallese, 2007), intermediate mathematics 
such as algebra (Landy, Brookes, & Smout, 2014), and even advanced mathematics 
involving imaginary numbers (Nemirovsky, Rasmussen, Sweeney, & Wawro, 2012).    
Another domain that seems particularly abstract is statistical learning, that is, the 
ability of infants and adults to learn the statistical structure of a domain through 
simple exposure.    But even here, there is some work supporting an embodied basis 
for this form of learning (Marsh & Glenberg, 2010).    
Nonetheless, it is probably impossible to empirically demonstrate that 
abstract representations and processes play no role in cognition.   In part this is 
because science does not have the tools to prove non-existence.   Another difficulty 
in ruling out abstract representations is related to the philosophical concept of 
constitution (e.g., Shapiro, 2011).    That is, as scientists we can demonstrate causal 
connections (e.g., between sensorimotor system activation and understanding).   
But, we do not have the tools to show that sensorimotor system activation 
constitutes cognition, that is, that the sensorimotor activation is cognition.  
Consequently, we are left with an argument based on simplicity:  Given that 
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embodied constructs can explain cognition and action, there is no need to invoke 
abstract symbols. 
In the early days of embodiment research, cognitive scientists were skeptical: 
At one conference, a prominent cognitive scientist publicly suggested that notions of 
embodiment were the equivalent of “fairy dust” and challenged researchers to 
demonstrate the validity of the ideas.    Using the methods of science, the field rose 
to that challenge.   Now the onus is on traditional cognitive scientists, those who 
wish to maintain a Cartesian distinction between human thought and action, a 
cherished and seemingly obvious belief, but ultimately, a type of flat-world 
hypothesis. 
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